Series: Plain Sight · No. 1 · An explainer · last reviewed 29 October 2026

In brief

Who this is for. People who run, fund, work in or write about NGOs and businesses in Tanzania, and anyone curious about why programs stop. It is an explainer, not a verdict. No organization named here is being accused of anything. Companies and funders have good reasons to change their plans, and every source is linked so you can check it.

About this series. Plain Sight looks at facts that are already public but rarely put side by side, and asks what they mean in practice. Each piece says how sure we can be.

A cartoon graveyard. Each gravestone carries the name of a program or business in Tanzania that stopped, and the year it ended.

The numbers to remember

The pattern in one picture

A timeline from 2018 to 2026. On the left, three businesses stopped operating in Tanzania: Tala in September 2019, Jumia in November 2019 and BrighterMonday in November 2020. On the right, funding and sector signals: a 2018 survey, USAID education funding falling from $25.2 million to $11.5 million between 2021 and 2024, worldwide aid falling 9 percent in 2024, a US funding pause in January 2025, UNAIDS reporting on HIV prevention in March 2025, and an NGO council chair's remarks in June 2026.

Finding 1. A program or business can stop because of a decision made elsewhere

How sure are we? Solid that these stopped. Only partly known why.

A vocational training center in Dar es Salaam had 200 students enrolled for the next term. Then the program behind it closed. CARE, an organization that worked with the program, says the students could not finish their training or get certified.

The program was Kijana Nahodha, a four-year, $10.5 million initiative funded by the United States. It aimed to give more than 40,000 young Tanzanians job skills and certificates, and it was due to run until 2026. The center was one of its 14 sites. CARE describes the closure as "abrupt." That is CARE's account, and funders have reasons for their decisions that are hard to see from outside. The point is not who was right. The point is that the center had no way to change the outcome, and 200 students were affected.

Think of a light switch in another room. The people in the first room need the light, but someone else decides when it goes off. Many organizations have a switch like this: one decision-maker can end something that many people depend on.

Businesses show it too. In November 2019, Jumia closed its online shopping business in Tanzania. It said it needed to "focus resources" on other markets. Two months earlier, the lender Tala had stopped lending in Tanzania. Techpoint reported that the company did not give a public reason and said legal restrictions limited what it could say. On 30 November 2020, the job website BrighterMonday closed. Its CEO pointed to the "current economic environment" and said many employers hired by word of mouth, not data. Its parent company said it would keep operating in markets where its businesses were "clear market leaders with a bright future."

These cases are different, and I am not suggesting anyone acted in bad faith. Companies and funders have many needs to balance. What the cases share is this. The decision was made somewhere else. It made sense to the people making it. And it reached people who were not in the room. Of the three business examples, only one explanation says anything about Tanzanian customers. So the public record cannot tell us whether weak local demand played a part in any of them. The people behind these decisions were making hard choices, and I respect that.

Finding 2. Many Tanzanian NGOs have relied mainly on money from outside the country

How sure are we? Solid for the 2018 survey, but it is dated. The number of respondents is not published.

A bar chart of where surveyed Tanzanian organizations got their money in 2018: international NGOs 71 percent, foundations 12 percent, foreign government agencies and international bodies 4.5 percent, and local sources under 10 percent, with the exact local figure not published.

The State of Philanthropy in Tanzania asked organizations where their money came from. Among those surveyed, international NGOs gave 71 percent of the funding. Local sources, such as individuals, companies and government, gave under 10 percent together. Fifty-seven percent of the organizations said all of their money came from outside sources. The survey cannot show whether this has changed since.

Finding 3. The supply of outside money has tightened since

How sure are we? Solid for the worldwide trend. For Tanzania, some figures are estimates or one expert's view, and the text says which.

None of this is a judgment on any donor's right to decide how to use its money. The question is what happens to the people who depend on a program when it ends.

Finding 4. Very little is known about what happens after funding ends

How sure are we? Thin. Nine studies, mostly in health, and two figures repeated from other sources.

This is the graveyard we don't study: the programs and businesses that ended, and what followed.

A 2022 review gathered the studies it could find on donor-funded health programs in Africa. Of 4,876 articles, only nine met its standards. In seven of those nine (about 78 percent), the program kept going after funding ended. Programs lasted longer when communities owned them, used local resources and had capable teams. They struggled when health systems were weak, money ran short, or donors and communities did not communicate well.

Nine studies are too few to call a rate. A paper in PLOS ONE about US-funded health services in South Africa says that "the literature estimates at least 40–50% of social programs collapse within a year after funding ends." It also says very few (1 percent) development projects are checked after donor funding ends. The paper repeats both figures from other sources. The two sets of numbers differ because they measure different things in different places. What they share is that few programs are followed up.

Finding 5. Business exits are hard to read too

How sure are we? Unclear. One widely quoted number has no published method, and the example below is the founders' own account.

If you read about Tanzanian startups, you will meet one figure: 60 to 70 percent fail within three years. The Citizen attributes it to a study by the Tanzania Investment and Consultant Group. The article does not say how the study counted failure or how many companies it covered. So it is hard to know how far to rely on the number. I would treat it as a question to explore, not a conclusion. Publishing the method would help everyone, including those of us who quote numbers.

One business held its own switch. In an interview with Atoms & Bits, the founders of Piki, a food and grocery delivery app, say it launched in December 2019 with $600,000 to $800,000 of their own invested and reinvested money and no outside funding. They say it has been profitable for 3.5 years. Those are the founders' figures, not audited ones. Having no outside party who could change its plans may have helped, but that is my reading, not a finding. Many other things matter too.

Five questions worth asking

These come from the pattern above. They are questions, not rules, and they apply to every organization, including mine. Feel free to use them in a team or board meeting.

  1. Who could end this work without our agreement?
  2. How much of our money comes from our single biggest source?
  3. If the money stopped, what should keep running, who would own it, and who would pay?
  4. Who will check what happened two or three years later?
  5. Where will we write it down, in plain words, for the next person?

What we do not know

A note on my own position

I work in this sector too, so these questions apply to my own work as much as anyone's. I offer them as things to ask, not as answers I have already worked out. If you spot something I missed, or a newer figure, please tell me through the contact page. I would rather correct it than leave it.

Three small asks

To funders: consider a small line in the budget for a check two or three years after a grant ends. To organizations and founders: when you stop or shrink something, a short public note on what ended and what you learned helps the next person. To journalists and researchers: a shared public record of exits, with sources, would help all of us check claims.

Switches will sometimes be flipped, and often for good reasons. The useful question is whether the people who depend on the light were ready, and whether anyone wrote down what happened.

Your turn

Which of the five questions would be hardest for your organization to answer? I would like to hear it, on LinkedIn or through the contact page. Your answer may show something I have missed.

Worth a closer look

If you read one source from this piece, read the 2022 review of donor-funded health programs. It is the clearest look I found at what helps a program continue after the money ends.

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Sources and method

Every figure comes from the public sources below. Where a figure is secondhand, an estimate or a company's own claim, the text says so. Nothing here was independently audited. The evidence on what happens after funding ends comes mostly from health and agriculture, not education.

Thanks to The Citizen, Techpoint, The Guardian (Tanzania), Atoms & Bits, Alliance magazine, CARE, UNAIDS and the OECD for the public work this builds on.

How to cite: Kamukulu, M. (2026, October 29). The Graveyard We Don't Study. michaelkamukulu.com. https://michaelkamukulu.com/writing/the-graveyard-we-dont-study/


Michael Kamukulu is the Executive Director of LearnImpact. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and were not independently audited.